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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LUCAS SHERRY: Collecting Culture: Explaining Sociability in Collectibles Markets 
 (Under the direction of Andrew Perrin) 
 
Cultures, like other group-level phenomena, are the result of a complex and iterative 
process whereby social environments provide individuals with desires, beliefs, and 
opportunities that guide individual actions in patterned ways. Actor-Network Theorists have 
been vocal in their assertion that objects are not passive intermediaries, but rather active 
mediators of human action. In markets, patterns in the characteristics of the objects for sale 
make certain trading behaviors more or less effective, profitable, etc. By analyzing books for 
collectibles that vary in the fungibility of the objects and organization of the markets, I find 
that the level of market organization and the fungibility of objects for sale are related to 
differences in the rates of ‘advised sociability,’ ‘sociability traps,’ and ‘anti-sociability.’
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Today is my last day at Goldman Sachs. After almost 12 years at the firm…I believe I have 
worked here long enough to understand the trajectory of its culture, its people and its 
identity. And I can honestly say that the environment now is as toxic and destructive as I have 
ever seen it.”     - Greg Smith in the New York Times 
Sociologists are primarily interested in producing empirical observations of social 
phenomena, and interpreting those observations by comparing them across time, place, or 
some other aspect of social setting. Recently, economic sociologists‟ focus on actual, rather 
than hypothetical or theoretical, economic behaviors has added important concepts to 
economic theory, such as „embeddedness,‟ and renewed interest in others, such as Keynes‟s 
„animal spirits.‟ Work in economic sociology has demonstrated the importance of culture, 
institutions, and networks of relations for understanding how, when, and why people 
exchange goods and services. While most economic sociology focuses exclusively on formal 
business and industry, informal exchange offers a window into market cultures less 
structured by formal institutions. 
Cultures, like other group-level phenomena, are the result of a complex and iterative 
process whereby social environments provide individuals with desires, beliefs, and 
opportunities that guide individual actions in patterned ways (Hedstrom 2005). Collectively, 
these individual actions create a new, but most often recognizable, social environment. While 
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Greg Smith laments a single firm, much criticism has been directed at capital investment 
markets in toto. The message of Occupy Wall Street seemed to be that responsibility for 
massive increases in inequality is not individual but structural; that is, the toxic culture of 
capital investment markets is the result of the increased opportunity to shape political 
processes afforded to the wealthiest persons and those that shuffle their money. 
Cultures vary by market. In some markets, vendors display apparently altruistic 
behavior when they supply an understocked fellow vendor at a wholesale price, instead of 
inflating the price or selling directly to the waiting customer (Varman and Costa 2009; 
Graddy 2006). At the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE), Mckenzie and Millo 
(2003) found „conditional cooperators‟ and „willing punishers,‟ people willing to defer 
personal gain for the sake of the market‟s long-term viability. These acts appear to result 
primarily from the existence of a network of ongoing relationships within these markets, 
which Granovetter (1985) calls „embeddedness.‟ However, other markets, like Robert 
Maisel‟s (1974) Alameda Penny Market, seem to foster elements of sociability, even among 
strangers.  
Besides embeddedness, what market characteristic might evoke sociability? Maisel‟s 
explanation of sociability as a palliative for boredom (502) does not agree with his 
characterization of the flea market as an „action scene‟ (494; see also Goffman 1967), and is 
therefore unsatisfying. The objects traded at the flea market tend to be singular in their 
quality, condition, and price and the opportunities and desires to purchase particular items are 
fairly diffuse. Unlike traders at the CBOE, flea marketers might expect immediate returns on 
sociable behavior in the form of information and contacts, in addition to long-term returns in 
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the form of market community. As such, it might be reasonable to expect sociability in 
singular, disorganized markets, even among strangers. 
Actor-Network Theorists have been vocal in their assertion that objects are not 
passive intermediaries, but rather active mediators of human action. Latour (2005) insists that 
objects are actors that transform the actions and associations of subjects, „enrolling‟ them 
into ongoing „projects‟ from which it is difficult to withdraw. “In addition to „determining‟ 
and serving as a „backdrop for human action,‟ things might authorize, allow, afford, 
encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on (72).” 
Humans create and shape objects to fill certain real or imagined needs, but these objects 
shape us as well by making certain behaviors, and even whole ways of living, more or less 
practical, achievable, affordable, or imaginable (see also Pollan 2001). 
In markets, patterns in the characteristics of the objects for sale make certain trading 
behaviors more or less effective, profitable, etc. While observing traders in markets provides 
data on what people do, books of advice written by expert traders for novices provide a 
clearer view of what traders ought to do.  By analyzing books for collectibles that vary in the 
fungibility of the objects and organization of the markets, I find that the level of market 
organization and the fungibility of objects for sale are related to differences in the rates of 
„advised sociability,‟ „sociability traps,‟ and „anti-sociability.‟ Although the results do not 
fully match the predictions made prior to analysis, I intend to show that variations in market 
culture cannot be fully understood without accounting for the organization and fungibility.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE:  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
CULTURAL THEORY: SCRIPTS AND REPERTOIRES 
Culture is frequently used to explain differences in behavior. National culture 
explains patterned differences in voluntary organizations (Camus-Vigué 2000), pre-school 
education (Tobin, Hsueh, and Karasawa 2009), the organization of labor and capital 
investment (Biernacki 2001) and even conceptions of self, group, and identity (Goleman 
1990). Lareau (2003) uses class culture to explain differences in childrearing. Bourdieu‟s 
Distinction (1987) focuses on how elites consume high-class cultural goods to distinguish 
themselves for non-elites. In the contemporary American context, high-status appetites may 
be omnivorous, but the goal, distinction, is the same (Peterson and Kern 1996; Johnston and 
Baumann 2007).  
Culture shapes action primarily by providing a repertoire, or „toolkit,‟ of behavioral 
scripts from which to choose (Swidler, 1986). Individuals select from their toolkit based on 
their own goals and expectations (Vaisey 2010), cultural myths linking particular scripts to 
success or failure (Swidler 2003), experiences of reward or punishment (Skinner 1938; 
Skinner 1974) and the influence of cultural authorities, in the form of „tastemakers‟ (Konzal 
1969; Seabrook 2000; see also Johnston and Baumann 2007) or parents and peers (Biddle et 
al 1980). Repertoires adapt as cultural authorities, the behaviors they advocate and myths 
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they embody are selected or abandoned as a result of reflection upon individual experience. 
While it would be a mistake to conclude that each behavioral pattern betrays a clear, obvious, 
and straightforward adaptation of culture to environment, the competition inherent in 
markets, and the relative clarity of success and failure, should result in an especially high 
level of cultural adaptation. 
NETWORK THEORY: EMBEDDEDNESS 
The primary contribution of economic sociology is recognition of the importance and 
an understanding of the effects of interpersonal relationships on economic behavior. Some 
economic sociologists (Dyer and Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997; Dore 1983) have emphasized the 
functions and importance of embedding economic transactions in interpersonal relationships; 
others (Mayer et al 1995; Granovetter 1985) have stressed the importance of preexisting 
relationships for initiating, expanding, or sustaining trade. 
Granovetter‟s (1985) concept of „embeddedness‟ adds network ties to other concepts, 
like price and utility maximization, to explain economic behavior. Networks of interpersonal 
relationships may provide tangible benefits to those who eschew opportunistic pricing and 
strict price/cost-based decisions in favor of information sharing and reciprocity (Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Dore 1983). Understandably, some economic agents embed their economic 
exchange within long-term relationships (Uzzi 1997) or alter their economic behavior when 
interacting with trusted partners (Gulati 1995). Somewhat paradoxically, the trust that results 
from repeated interaction increases both the opportunity for and payoff of malfeasance 
(Granovetter 1985). 
Rauch and Hamilton (2001) establish two ideal types of exchange systems:  markets, 
where exchange is episodic, anonymous, and governed by price, and networks, where 
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“agents pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations” (p. 1). Economic systems often exhibit 
characteristics of both networks and markets. Dore (1983) shows that stable interfirm 
networks within Japanese textile manufacturing create „goodwill‟ and mutual dependency. 
These help firms coordinate their actions, result in more efficient information transfer and 
lead to the production of higher quality goods (p. 475). In bazaars and fish markets with 
stable vendor populations, intervendor relationships allow understocked vendors to acquire 
merchandise from another, often on credit and at wholesale prices (Graddy 2006; Varman 
and Costa 2009).  
Kinship (Dawkins 2004) and reciprocity (Trivers 1971) are the two most widely 
accepted explanations for cooperative behavior in biological organisms (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981). Cooperating parties, bound by kinship or future expectations of reciprocity, 
receive privileged access to certain resources and states of being. “Many of the benefits 
sought by living things are disproportionately available to cooperating groups” (p. 1391). By 
working together, individuals are able to produce or attain more than they would have been 
able to individually. However, it is often the case that any particular individual would benefit 
even more if they „defect‟ while others cooperate (Granovetter 1985). In large organizations, 
an individual‟s contribution has a negligible effect on the capacity of the organization to 
produce collective benefits but has non-negligible costs to those individuals; „free-riders‟ 
avoid the costs of participation while still benefiting the collective benefits produced  (Olson 
1965). Under these conditions, participation hinges not only on the expected result of a 
collective action, but also the expectation that others will participate rather than defect 
(Fireman and Gamson 1979). 
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Maintaining high levels of cooperation requires a trust that others will not defect. 
Repeated, successful interactions generate trust among firms (Gulati 1995). Repeated face-to-
face exchange among a stable, defined group creates „conditional co-operators‟ and „willing 
punishers,‟ solving problems of collective action (MacKenzie and Millo 2003). Network ties, 
particularly non-redundant ties, facilitate information sharing, increasing access to 
opportunities (Burt 2004; Granovetter 1973). More generally, market communities counter 
the individualizing, atomizing effects of competitive market exchange (Fligstein 2002; 
Polanyi 1944), preventing a pathological state of normlessness, „anomie‟, which would 
characterize sheer individualized marketeering and encourage „free-riding‟ (see Durkheim 
2006; Durkheim and Coser 1997). 
The importance of reciprocation and cooperation for stable network formation might 
provide one incentive for sociability. However, it is unlikely that the importance of networks 
fully explains sociability within collectibles markets. Collectors scour a wide range of venues 
for their particular obsession (Belk et al 1991; Mesker 2001; Judy 2008; Cole 1967). A wide 
search necessarily means interacting and trading with a host of new and unknown persons. 
The possibility of opportunism increases the costs of economic exchange (Williamson 1985).  
INTERACTION RITUAL THEORY: EMOTIONAL ENERGY 
Strangers exchanging face-to-face must send appropriate signals to their partners to 
establish a favorable impression (Goffman 1959). Mimicking a sociable outlook might send 
the right signals to partners while avoiding whatever costs might accrue to sociable traders. 
However, humans value sincerity in partners (Blau 1964) and concealing character traits and 
ambitions over time is a difficult task (Goffman 1959). Keeping up such an act is likely more 
difficult and costly than sincere sociability. 
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Prices are socially constructed, and price setting is a social activity (Prus 1985). 
People experiencing positive emotional states judge people and objects more favorably, 
underestimate risks and overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes (Aspinwall 1998; 
Lane 1991). Subjective emotional estimations, Keynes (1936) „animal spirits,‟ must govern 
economic exchange whenever risk cannot be objectively estimated (DiMaggio 2002). 
Interaction rituals are one way to generate positive emotional states. Collins (2005) claims 
that successful interaction rituals combine „physical copresence‟ and „mutual focus,‟ leading 
to „emotional entrainment‟ and the build-up of „emotional energy.‟ Sociability should help 
facilitate successful interaction rituals by maintaining „physical copresence‟ and creating 
„mutual focus‟ through conversation. These interactions, if performed satisfactorily, lead to 
positive emotional states for participants and influence their evaluations of risk and reward. 
ACTOR NETWORK THEORY: DEFINITION AND ENROLLMENT 
The compatibility with important objects may select for some cultural scripts and 
against others. Schinkel (2004) argues that objects place limits on their use and, therefore, 
partly determine the behaviors that humans adopt to make use of them.  
“[T]he definition of the object consists of a privileging of certain courses of action towards the object 
over certain alternative courses of action…Practice is defined by the object‟s definition precisely 
because certain courses of action become more probable than others (P. 405).”  
 
The use, or „practice,‟ of an object is probabilistically constrained by an object‟s 
characteristics, or „definition.‟ The „definition‟ of singular objects, for example, resists bulk 
sale, since there would be qualitative as well as quantitative differences between different 
bulk packages. Singular items mediate the buyer-seller relationship by limiting the practices 
of buyers and sellers.  
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In addition to defining their use, objects pattern user‟s behavior over time by 
„enrolling‟ them into various „projects‟ (Latour 2005). The use of any particular object often 
requires adopting many others, or even an entire lifestyle. A speedboat owner must also be 
truck and trailer owner, a gasoline consumer, and a member of a marina of yacht club. If she 
desires company on a boat, she must associate with others that enjoy being on the water. Just 
as discrete actions are bundled into cultural scripts, a particular use of a discrete object is 
bundled together with particular ways of using many other objects into a „project‟. 
„Enrollment‟ is a path dependent process, as a single association enmeshes one in a 
whole web of associations. Activities are path dependent when earlier actions predict later 
actions. “[P]ath dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which 
contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic 
properties” (Mahoney 2000:507). Paths may be periodically disestablished, allowing the 
establishment and entrenchment of new paths, but a significant exogenous shock is needed to 
disrupt these relatively stable processes (Haydu 2009). Individuals, groups, or even whole 
societies adjust their behavior in multiple contexts to suit the expectations and requirements 
of particularly entrenched processes, even when presented with seemingly superior 
alternatives.  
Path dependency is frequently found in the adoption of particular technologies. For 
example, Charles Latham Sholes, a Milwaukee printer, replaced his typewriter‟s alphabetical 
keyboard with an early QWERTY-type keyboard “in an effort to reduce the frequency of 
typebar clashes” (David 1985:333). Sholes licensed his typewriter to E. Remington and Sons, 
and millions of typists have since been trained to use the QWERTY keyboard. QWERTY 
remains ubiquitous despite the appearance of highly attractive alternatives, like the Dvorak 
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Simplified Keyboard. “But while they are, as we now say, perfectly „free to choose,‟ their 
behavior, nevertheless, is held fast in the grip of events long forgotten and shaped by 
circumstances in which neither they nor their interests figured” (333). Although the technical 
superiority of the QWERTY keyboard over an alphabetical arrangement helped enroll typists 
and manufacturers early in the QWERTY project, continued participation in this project does 
not depend upon the continued superiority of the QWERTY keyboard over alternatives.   
The combination of definition and enrollment is a powerful force for shaping human 
behavior and, therefore, the cognitive schemes that provide scripts and orient behavior. 
Collectibles „enroll‟ collectors in a „project‟ where success hinges upon specialized 
knowledge, a willingness to attend to individual pieces in a thorough manner, and a particular 
social network structure. Cultural myths, like the „Edenic myth of sociability,‟ orient 
behaviors within particular institutions (Swidler 2003). If relevance is necessary for the 
survival of cultural myths, than objects shape not only the actual behaviors enacted, but also 
the myths that give meaning to those behaviors. 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION THEORY: SOCIABILITY 
Georg Simmel (1949) defined sociability as “association for its own sake” (p. 254). 
Participants „play‟ a „game of forms‟ in order to achieve association, rather than to fulfill or 
pursue some material need or interest. 
Sociability is the art or play form of association, related to the content and purposes of association in 
the same way as art is related to reality. While sociable interaction centers upon persons, it can occur 
only if the more serious purposes of the individual are kept out, so that it is an interaction not of 
complete but of symbolic and equal personalities (P. 254). 
 
An encounter is sociable to the degree that the ends pursued by all parties are associational, 
not instrumental, and the means „playful,‟ not „serious.‟ While forms of sociability might not 
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always be congenial on the surface (see Schiffrin 1984), in this project „sociability‟ refers to 
the „Edenic vision of sociability‟ observed by Maisel at the Alameda Penny Market.  
Maisel‟s explanation of the „Edenic vision‟ is both questionable and unsatisfying. 
Based on vendor interviews, Maisel categorizes three myths that give meaning to behavior 
well-suited to a competitive market and „action scene‟: the rags-to-riches „Horatio Alger‟ 
myth, the instant profit of „the killing,‟ and the „character contest‟ (p. 501). However, another 
myth, the „Edenic vision of sociability,‟ gives meaning to friendly, cooperative association 
for its own sake. Maisel explains this myth by citing the market‟s „tedium.‟ “The „sociability 
myth‟ influences the conviction that one is having a good time, or, more specifically, a good 
day, and thus helps to gloss over the ordinary details of tedium, toil, and poor sales” (p. 502). 
Flea markets, it seems, are sociable because so little business is conducted that one requires 
sociable interaction to distract from „tedium, toil, and poor sales.‟ 
Sherry (1990) provides a refinement to Maisel‟s (1974) analysis of sociability by 
placing the flea market at the center of two continua representing the function and structure 
of interactions in a market. Flea markets are equally festive and economic in function, and 
equally formal and informal in structure, resulting in “greater dialectical intensity…That is, 
the counterpoised dimensions of the model are brought into such intimate association and are 
condensed so tightly that the resulting tension is palpable to participants and seems to 
energize them as well” (p. 17). Lacking a universally accepted and enacted set of scripts for 
interaction, the flea market is a highly unpredictable, and therefore exciting, place. While 
thoroughly descriptive, Sherry‟s continua fail to explain why interactions within a market 
express particular functional and structural patterns. 
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SYNTHETIC THEORY: SINGULARITY AND DISORGANIZATION 
The lack of fungibility in the goods for sale might explain the functional and 
structural nature of the flea market. Fungibility, according to Dictionary.com, is legal term 
meaning “freely exchangeable or replaceable, in whole or in part, for another of like nature 
or kind.” Simply, fungible goods are those that have, or can act as, substitutes for another. A 
fungible object, like a new mass-market car or a dollar bill, is qualitatively indistinguishable 
from, and therefore substitutable for, many others. Flea market objects are singular; they are 
culled from a long span of manufacturing history, vary in their design as well as the quality 
of their materials and execution. Even identically produced items experience a differential 
history, embodied in the item‟s unique condition.  
In addition to the singularity of objects for sale, the flea market is relatively 
disorganized. Organization, in this case, is the degree to which supply and demand match 
within a market. Just as wholesale distributes manufactured goods among many retailers, 
retail spreads individual consumer goods out within a population. Secondhand resale rarely 
recreates the concentration of desires and opportunities to buy particular goods found in retail 
sale. Locating particular goods is difficult in disorganized markets. Sherry (1990a) observed 
fleas using novel methods to overcome those difficulties, like “sporting printed T-
shirts…[and] baseball caps proclaiming their desire to buy…„old fishing gear‟ [or] 
„Prohibition gangster items‟ ”(p. 23). Such extreme behaviors would be inappropriate and 
unnecessary in more organized markets. 
The specialization necessary for collecting suggests that the abstract markets for 
collectibles are more highly organized than, for example, any particular flea market. 
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However, as Mesker (2001) points out, buying in the most organized markets, specialty 
auctions and shows, is less strategic and, frankly, less interesting. 
Try to avoid getting too caught up in the concern for top quality, pristine condition items. You're not 
going to have much fun in the hunt. The premium items are available for sale in quantity. All you have 
to do is pick up an auction catalog or go to prominent Civil War shows and buy the best at the highest 
dollar with all the guarantees involved. If you're like me, you only have $20. See how much you can 
get, how far you can stretch that budget, and how much history you can buy (P. 4) 
 
Mesker, it appears, seeks not the best piece but rather the best deal. Unlike „buying the best at 
the highest dollar with all the guarantees‟ at auctions and specialized shows, „stretching your 
budget‟ requires energy and skill. „Hunting‟ recalls Maisel‟s use of „action,‟ where skill and 
energy are applied within a market to produce a satisfactory outcome. Paying „the highest 
dollar‟ represents no strategic achievement because it trades money for an expert‟s skill, 
discernment, and effort.  
Variation between  markets in fungibility and organization should predict variation in 
sociability. Actor Network Theory suggests that singular objects in disorganized markets will 
be traded with greater sociability due to the increase in the knowledge and interpersonal 
relationships necessary to trade effectively. Further, DiMaggio‟s (2002) analysis of „animal 
spirits‟ suggests that the decreased rational basis for estimating risk in such markets increases 
the importance one‟s emotional state. Interaction Ritual theory argues that positive emotional 
energy can be created through successful interaction rituals, which sociability would seem to 
promote. Together, all of this suggests that sociable behaviors would be most appropriate for 
disorganized markets of singular goods. 
Collectibles are often individually „picked‟ from thrift stores, junkyards, estate or 
garage sales by vendors, and travel up the „resale ladder‟ to specialized dealers and then 
collectors (see Stanton 2011). Brokering has been identified as a difficult, but lucrative task 
(Burt 2004). Using the „ladder‟ metaphor, brokers can be described as the rungs that allow 
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objects to move from sources below to customers above them by combining the knowledge 
necessary to identify undervalued pieces with a network containing persons willing to pay 
the objects „true‟ value. 
Brokerage of singular goods should require more knowledge than fungible goods. 
Markets of singular objects expose participants to many more different types of objects that 
must be identified and appraised, and requiring greater knowledge. Maisel expressed the 
importance of this historical-cultural knowledge by categorizing fleas as either 
„knowledgeable‟ or „naïve,‟ instead of a more straightforward „vendor‟ and „shopper‟ 
typology (p. 494). „Knowledgeable‟ fleas, those that are actually „in the action‟ at the flea 
market, are those that possess the evaluative scripts necessary to recognize otherwise 
unrecognized value.  
Disorganization problematizes the matching of buyers and sellers, requiring more 
interpersonal ties in order to locate a stocked dealer or interested buyer. Even in the absence 
of more or better evaluative scripts, brokerage can succeed through access to a social 
network containing more or better buyers. In disorganized markets, one should expect 
particularly fat returns on interpersonal relationships in the form of information, referrals, 
and personalized, „first look‟ sales. Disorganized markets can be reasonably expected to 
reward, if not require, a vast web of interpersonal ties.  
Singularity and disorganization also minimize the rational basis for estimating risk. 
Singularity, the result of variation in manufacture and history, leads to imperfect substitution 
and increases the possibility of misidentification. Rosen (1981) argues that extremely skewed 
price distributions in „superstar‟ markets result from imperfect substitution, 
disproportionately increasing the demand for top performers. A skewed price distribution 
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increases the potential payoff of arbitrage. To exploit the skewed price distribution of 
collectibles, dealers must combine the knowledge, or some estimation, of an object‟s value 
above its price and access to potential buyers agreeable to that higher price.  
Successful collectors of singular objects with disorganized markets face great 
difficulties focusing their desires and then locating, evaluating, and modifying desired goods. 
They must negotiate and close face-to-face deals with strangers over goods of unclear value. 
If they want to sell at a market or show, they must occupy a table with their goods. The 
„sociability myth‟ might effectively orient ones actions in this type of market by generating 
„sociable acquisitions,‟ information and contacts acquired through sociable interaction, and 
„sociable lubrication,‟ the generation of positive emotional energy within a particular 
interaction. 
CONTRIBUTION 
This project opens a new vista in economic sociology by testing a theory of objects 
that mediate associations within a market by encouraging the application of particular 
cultural scripts. It is not sufficient to assume that the apparent incongruity between a 
competitive market and an „Edenic vision of sociability‟ necessarily means that sociability is 
irrational or dysfunctional. Instead, analysis should consider possible economic advantages 
accrued through behavior inspired by this myth. This project examines the extent to which 
sociability characterizes advice given in books on collectibles markets and uses variation in 
the fungibility of the collectibles and organization of the market to predict behavior that 
either resembles, prompts, or runs counter to sociability. I will use descriptive and inferential 
statistics to test an explanation of the „Edenic vision of sociability‟ as a cultural myth that 
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orients behavior toward a set of behavioral scripts, which are sociable in content, but also 
well adapted to disorganized markets of singular goods. 
Economists frequently take objects seriously as, for example, forces constraining 
markets through information asymmetry (Akerlof 1973) or the need to clear merchandise 
quickly due to spoilage (Graddy 2006). In contrast, sociologists tend to treat objects as 
epiphenomenal, passive „intermediaries‟ (Latour 2005). Objects, as intermediaries, are 
defined and redefined by humans to suit particular needs within particular contexts.  “[T]he 
stern advice commonly given those who flirt with the notion that technical artifacts have 
political qualities:  What matters is not technology itself, but the social or economic system 
in which it is embedded” (Winner 2000:19). Objects are set up as receivers or receptacles of 
meaning, intention, and action; they make no independent demands. One sees such treatment 
in Weber‟s (1946) classic analysis of bureaucracies. Weber defines bureaucracies in part 
through their use of files, but fails to explore how those files mediate human relationships, 
such as those between bureaucrats and clients; files may even be destroyed without changing 
the functioning of the bureaucracy (229). Files simply reflect, rather than propel or interrupt, 
the process of rationalization.  
Sociologists are better equipped than economists to understand the complex 
interactions of subjects and objects in the production of market culture. Sociology lacks 
economic‟s ideological commitment to individual instrumental action. Sociologists 
understand the fundamental importance of relationships of trust and power (see Granovetter 
2002) and interactions rituals (Collins 2005) to economic institutions, and are equipped to 
use concepts like embeddedness and emotional energy to understand observed patterns in 
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markets. However, variation in the „definition‟ of the objects traded represents a largely 
unrecognized limitation to applying theory from one type of market to another. 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
THE CASE: COLLECTIBLES MARKETS 
The benefits realized through sociable behavior in singular-disorganized markets are 
plausible, but undemonstrated. Demonstration requires comparing the efficiency or 
appropriateness of sociable behaviors between markets that vary on one or both of those 
dimensions. Flea markets, for example, could be compared to organized handicraft stores, 
like Pier 1 Imports, dealing in fungible, albeit handmade, goods (see Wherry 2008). Fish 
markets are organized, but fish vary greatly in quality and are not strictly substitutable 
(Graddy 2006). Street vendors operate within a disorganized but more highly fungible market 
(Duneier 2000). Texts produced by market experts could provide a measure of the 
appropriateness of sociability and, if it varies by market, an explanation. 
Controlled comparison requires eliminating as many sources of exogenous variation 
as possible. The behaviors described in texts on fish and flea markets likely vary simply 
because of differences between the authors of and audiences for such descriptions. Ideally, I 
would compare texts produced by and for demographics that were similar in all 
characteristics except the markets in which they participate. While difficult to accomplish 
using scholarly and/or popular writings on divergent sectors of the economy, advice books 
produced for collectors record concrete behaviors and strategies useful within particular 
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markets and limit the variation in both authors and audience while providing variation in 
fungibility and organization.  
 
Figure 1 shows collectible types arranged by the fungibility of the objects that make 
up that collectible and the organization of the market for them. Coding and preliminary 
analysis of the singular-disorganized subsample resulted in several predictions about the 
content of two other subsamples of fungible collectibles, one of objects with organized and 
the other with disorganized markets. Simply, I expect the sociability of the behaviors advised 
to decrease with increased organization and fungibility 
THE MEDIUM: ADVICE BOOKS 
In an analysis of commonly played board and card games, DiCicco-Bloom and 
Gibson (2010) identify the behavioral patterns described by players and describe their 
emergence from combinations of rules and constraints in order to predict behavior in similar 
social settings. They were “less concerned with how a game is played than with how, 
according to its master theorists, it ought to be played” (p. 250, emphasis in original). They 
chose to analyze the writings of master players because “these theorists have the most to tell 
Figure 1: Collectible Types by Subsample
Disorganized Organized
Books Beanie Babies
Fungible Comics Coins
Records Stamps
Trading Cards Swatch Watches
Art
Ceramics
Singular Civil War Items
Furniture Empty
General Antiques
Instruments
Medical Items
Vintage Watches
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us about the deep implications of the games‟ rules and constraints” (p. 250). Although games 
have, and markets lack, clear and unequivocal rules, advice books for collectibles are written 
by experts to advise novices on how one ought to behave in the market.  
Hochschild (2003) employed a similar method, comparing „traditional‟ and „modern‟ 
relationship advice books. She found evidence that the shift towards feminism in relationship 
advice was only partial. “From the vantage point of the early feminist movement, modern 
advice books reaffirm one ideal (equality) but undermine another (emotionally rich social 
bonds) (15).” Hochschild and other relationship advice critics (see Kaminer 1993; Simonds 
1992; Tavris 1993), use advice as markers for the presence of particular ideological 
components, which they critique. In contrast, I conceptualize the advice contained within the 
books as a sample of the scripts in an expert collector‟s repertoire. This shift allows advice 
books to meaningfully inform our understanding of economic exchange within markets. 
Advice books are well suited to market research. They are readily accessible record of 
expert opinion on both market context and culture. Their production spans many decades, 
allowing for comparative historical work. This method could even be employed to study 
other settings for which similar texts are available, like sports (e.g. Long and Czarnecki 2011 
on football; Christensen and Demeere 2001 or Barnes 2005 on martial arts). 
CODING 
Advice books provide descriptions of the tasks a collector will face and the advice of 
an expert on how to accomplish the task successfully. A Practical Guide to Collecting Civil 
War instructs readers to “pay attention to the strategies described and to the situations 
encountered and then apply them to your own collection (Mesker 2001:ix).” A set of task 
codes and a set of advice codes were applied to a sample of advice books to represent the 
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„situations‟ and „strategies‟ described in each text using a repeated, three-step process. First, I 
read a single paragraph and determined the task codes that could be assigned to it. Second, I 
determined if and where the paragraph should be split into smaller passages. Third, I 
assigned any applicable advice codes.  
Determining which task codes should be assigned requires abstracting the challenge, 
task, or other activity described into one or more of the seven general categories of tasks: 
„focusing‟ one‟s interests, „locating‟ pieces for sale, „evaluating‟ a piece‟s worth, 
„negotiating‟ a price, „closing‟ a deal, „modifying‟ a piece (i.e. through cleaning, repair, 
historical research), and „tableing‟ at a show or sale. 
Some paragraphs have multiple task codes assigned to them. When it was a single 
task that blurred the lines between two or more of the seven codes, the paragraph was treated 
as a single passage with multiple task code assignments. When an author mentions some sub-
class of collectible that might „catch on‟ in the future, the task of considering that class as 
worthy of your collecting combines „evaluating‟ worth and „focusing‟ interest. When 
confronted with distinct tasks within a single paragraph, I split the paragraph into multiple 
passages. For each passage, I scanned the list of advice codes and assigned any that fit the 
operationalized definition for the code. I frequently consulted these definitions while coding, 
and would often mark passages with an additional „revisit‟ code so that I could re-evaluate 
my least confident decisions at a later time. 
I produced the final code list in two main stages: first, codes were added to the list as 
behaviors were identified in the texts and abstracted into codes that would generalize to other 
collectibles. For example, Judy (2008) advises examining the cover and case of each watch, 
and opening the back of the watch to inspect the movement. „Examine the cover‟ and 
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„inspect the movement‟ would not be very useful codes, because they are specific to watches. 
Usable codes are abstracted behaviors that are applicable to other types of collectibles. 
Abstracting „examine the cover‟ and „inspect the movement‟ results in the code „examine 
closely,‟ which sacrifices precision, but not accuracy, for transferability. 
Second, all codes without a clear relationship to sociability were eliminated. Those 
advice codes labeled „advised sociability,‟ „sociability traps,‟ or „anti-sociability‟ were 
retained; all other advice codes were eliminated from the code list. This shortened, and 
simplified, the code list resulting in faster coding and, more importantly, a decreased chance 
of overlooking an applicable code. While this eliminated many strategies from the data, only 
advised sociability, sociability traps, and anti-sociability type behaviors were of substantive 
interest for this project. 
„Advised sociability‟ codes are behaviors that represent an overlap between advisable 
and sociable behaviors. That is, some advisable behaviors are the same as with those 
behaviors performed by a hypothetical person for whom “[e]conomic exchange is seen as 
incidental to social pleasantry” (Maisel 1974:502). Importantly, this does not mean that the 
behavior is non-instrumental or that the author must be advising ignoring the economics of 
the situation. Rather, these codes are behaviors advised in the text for any reason that would 
also be expected from one whose behavior was guided by the „Edenic vision of sociability.‟  
An example of advised sociability is „introduce interests.‟ Introducing your interests 
provides an invitation to and material for sociable interaction. Introducing interests also helps 
one locate pieces in a disorganized market.  
I usually go around flea market asking every person who is selling antiques or collectibles if they have 
brought any old watches with them that day. Many of these dealers and vendors keep the good stuff 
hidden out of sight and only bring it out if someone asks or seems interested (Judy 2008:9). 
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Cautious dealers hide valuable or fragile merchandise to avoid damage or theft until a serious 
buyer appears.  Introducing your interests should lead to additional opportunities to purchase 
the kind of collectibles you are interested in. 
Most dealers are constantly shopping for new merchandise. An introduction may 
recruit a well-connected dealer who is on the prowl for desirable goods to resell. “If you 
contact the people who provide estate liquidation services, they can put you on their mailing 
list and keep you informed of upcoming estate sales where watches are present. They might 
even let you have the first look at them” (Judy 2008:10). Alternatively, you might coax a 
seller to dig up a piece that, until the introduction, they thought was not worth putting out for 
sale. “A dental collector tells of over 1,000 letters in his files, attempts to track down 
descendants of early dentists who just might have old literature or instruments tucked safely 
away in an attic” (Fredgant 1981:2). This overlap of advisable and sociable behaviors 
rewards sociable collectors for their behavior, even if it is not strategically motivated. 
„Sociability traps‟ are actions that create opportunities for others to engage one in 
sociable interaction for the purposes of generating a successful interaction ritual. Successful 
interaction rituals generate emotional energy (Collins 2005) and would likely increase one‟s 
willingness to buy (DiMaggio 2002).  These interactions may be unwanted, unwelcome, and 
uncomfortable, hence the use of „trap‟. One example of a sociability trap is „handle objects.‟ 
Picking out a reproduction or fake often requires physically handling an object to feel its 
weight. Grading an objects condition might be aided by feeling its surface for cracks or 
checking for loose or flimsy pieces. Handling signals an interest and invites sellers to initiate 
a conversation. 
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Finally, „anti-sociability‟ codes are behaviors that minimize sociable interaction at the 
market. One of the costs of sociability is time, and one anti-sociability code is „be speedy‟. In 
a competitive market with imperfect substitution, time is an invaluable resource not to be 
squandered. Recognizing this, McCree (2003) advises bargain hunters to  
Be as thorough as possible at each stop on your rounds, but be quick to move on once you've made 
your purchases or decided there's nothing for you. You'll be competing with experienced pros who 
know exactly what they're looking for, so you must learn to be both speedy and sharp. In fleadom, it's 
first come, first served; there are rarely any second chances. Check out the merchandise for flaws so 
you know what you're getting, but don't linger (P. 49). 
 
As the full economic exchange must still be completed while time squeezed for every 
possible opportunity, being speedy reduces one‟s ability to „treat economic exchange as 
incidental to social pleasantry.‟ The conditions that I have theorized to reward sociability, 
singularity and disorganization, also seem to threaten sociability by providing a competitive 
advantage to those who „don‟t linger.‟ Therefore, it will be important not only to track 
instances of advised sociability and sociability traps, which should encourage sociable 
behavior, but also instances of anti-sociability, which might discourage sociable behavior. 
Advice codes vary in their relevance to each task. Some advice codes, like „request a 
better price,‟ are applicable only to „negotiating.‟ Such a behavior couldn‟t help you 
accomplish any of the other tasks. Others codes, like „survey the market,‟ might help focus 
one‟s desires by showing the range of goods available or locate a particular piece for sale.. A 
task code is „linked‟ when there is a meaningful co-occurrence of one advice and one task 
code within the sample. This is operationalized as three co-occurrences or co-occurrence 
within 10% of the total passages with that advice code.  
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Figure 2 shows the linkages between task and advice codes organized by code family. 
The task codes „locate,‟ „evaluate,‟ and „negotiate‟ account for 37 of the 45 total links. This  
suggests that the advice codes assigned are concentrated within passages assigned these task 
codes. Although „be interested‟ is linked to „focusing,‟ „evaluating,‟ and „modifying,‟ it is a 
rare advice code. „Handle objects,‟ and „examine closely,‟ however, are two of the most 
frequently assigned codes. Each is linked only to evaluating, making sociability traps 
Figure 2: Advice-to-Task Code Links by Code Family
Task Code Advised Sociability Sociability Traps Anti-Sociability
Focus survey market be interested 2
Locate barter be speedy
be kind deal with reputables
build relationships
get a first look
introduce interests
join a club
join with friends
know your market
recruit extra eyes
survey market
talk shop 13
Evaluate ask questions be interested deal with reputables
build relationships examine closely don't trust others
join a club handle objects get a partner
know your market
see collections
stay cool
survey market
talk shop 14
Negotiate ask questions apply leverage
barter don't trust others
be honest
be kind
be reasonable
build relationships
request a better price
stay cool 10
Close 0
Modify join a club be interested don't trust others 3
Table cultivate a good mood get a partner 3
refer to other dealers
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particularly concentrated within passages assigned the task code „evaluating.‟ In contrast, the 
task code „closing‟ is not linked to any individual advice code. This task code is so 
infrequently assigned that no advice code co-occurs with „closing‟ at a meaningful rate.  
The use of an etic classification scheme, not found in nor recognized by the advice 
book authors themselves, makes coding decisions both subjective and disputable; I was 
conservative in including codes in the „advised sociability‟ and „sociability traps‟ families to 
avoid overstating the importance of sociability in these markets. Additionally, I marked 
questionable codes for later review to minimize the effect of daily mood or disposition.  
DATA AND SUBSAMPLES 
The data for this project are a set of coded advice books divided into the three 
subsamples. These subsamples are shown in Table 1. The first subsample includes ten texts 
on singular collectibles with disorganized markets, including antique furniture, ceramics, 
antique and vintage watches, and civil war memorabilia. The second subsample includes six 
texts on fungible collectibles with organized markets, including books, records, comics, and 
trading cards. The third subsample includes four texts on fungible collectibles with organized 
markets, including stamps, coins, Beanie Babies™ and Swatch™ watches. The fourth 
combination, singular and organized, is an empty cell. I could not come up with a collectible 
that was individually produced (or otherwise unsubstitutable) but distributed primarily 
through retail or directly from the producer, although it is possible such collectibles exists. 
Selection of texts was for range on collectible type and year within each subsample. 
Selecting for range limits the possible effect these variables can have on the outcome of the 
analysis. To be eligible for selection, books had to contain advice for collectors; price guides,  
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Table 1: Advice Texts by Subsample
Title Year Selections Author Pgs. 
Singular-Disorganized Sources
1. Antique Collectors 
Manual
1952 (1) Detecting Furniture Frauds Raymond F. Yates 22
2. Golden Guide to 
American Antiques
1967 all Ann Kilborn Cole 100
3. Poor Man's Guide to 
Antique Collecting
1971 (p5) Reproductions; (p9) All is 
Vanity; (p47) horsey set
John Mebane 15
4. Medical, Dental and 
Pharmaceutical 
Collectibles
1981 Introduction of each section Don Fredgant 10
5. Japanese Antique 
Furniture
1983 (2) Evaluating; (Appendix 1) 
Shops
Rosy Clarke 25
6. Idiots Guide to Buying 
and Selling Collectibles
2000 (21) paintings and drawings Laurie Rozackis 35
7. Practical Guide to 
Collecting Civil War
2001 all James P Mesker 75
8. Antiques Roadshow 
20th Century Collectibles
2002 (1) Ceramics Carol Prissant 30
9. Antique Woodwind 
Instruments
2005 Intro to Identifying and Valuing Peter Adams 10
10. Watches Warman's 
Companion
2008 Foreword; Intro; Watch Values 
and Identification
Dean Judy 25
Fungible-Disorganized Sources
11. How to Identify and 
Collect American First 
Editions
1976 All except pgs 20-57 describing 
specific first edition markings 
Jack Tannen 80
12. The Record Collector’s 
Handbook
1980 Intro plus beginning of chs 
1,3,7,12
Allen Leibowitz 35
13. Collecting Comic 
Books
1983 All chapters but (4) Marcia Leiter 95
14. Idiots Guide to Buying 
and Selling Collectibles
2000 (10) Cards Laurie Rozackis 20
15. Antiques Roadshow 
20th  Century Collectibles
2002 (4) Baseball Carol Prissant 30
16. A Guide to Collecting 
Everyman’s Literature
2005 Everything that wasn’t a 
bibliographical list
Terry Seymour 80
Fungible-Organized Sources
17. The Complete Book of 
Coin Collecting
1959 (1) Beginning; (5) Profit; (6) 
Cleaning and Care
Joseph Coffin 55
18. Stamp Collecting for 
Fun and Profit
1963 (1) Introduction; (3) XVII-XVIII 
reprints and forgeries 
Fred J Melville 65
19. Complete Idiot's Guide 
to Beanie Babies
1998 (4) A Little Something Special; 
(5) Keeping an Eye on Things
Holly Stowe and 
Carol Turkington
50
20. Swatch: Guide for 
Connoisseur and Collector
2003 (2) Collecting Swatch Frank Edwards 10
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histories, and visual dictionaries were excluded, unless they also contained advice for 
collectors. Texts came predominantly from the libraries at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. Others were purchased in bookstores and online. 
Some books feature advice for singular and fungible collectibles. Chapters from these 
books have been included in each of the samples to further reduce possible confounding 
variation. In these cases, chapters are coded and analyzed separately; unspecified chapters 
(i.e. a general introduction) are excluded. The fungible subsamples are each smaller than the 
singular-disorganized subsample because the singular-disorganized subsample was analyzed 
to develop a set of mechanisms linking market objects and advisable behaviors. Theory 
testing requires fewer texts than theory development. This design controls for the medium of 
the collectibles advice book and the audience of collectors by holding them constant across 
the two samples. 
Publishing firms act as gatekeepers, designating (and publishing) those they deem 
„experts‟ in a field (citation needed). This project assumes that texts are produce by experts 
on the subject of the particular market. This assumption is buttressed by biographical claims 
about authors that are present on the back covers and within the text of books. For example, 
the back cover of The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Beanie Babies® states that one author, 
Holly Stowe, “is a regular contributor to Beanie Collector magazine and writes the column 
„The Beanie Dance of Joy‟ for Beanie Mania magazine.” Carol Turkington, the other author, 
is “the author of two dozen books and magazine articles.” The „About the Author‟ section of 
A Guide to Collecting Everyman’s Library announces the author‟s “bachelor‟s degree in 
English from Princeton” and boasts that the author‟s collection of Everyman‟s Library books 
“exceeds 5,000 volumes.” A practical Guide to Collecting Civil War claims that author 
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James P. Mesker is “a historical researcher and archivist [that] has been  the subject of 
articles in the Cleveland Plain Dealer,” has collected for 42 years, won prizes at Civil War 
shows, is an active reenactor and is even a “direct descendant of a Civil War veteran.” and 
Unfortunately, many of the books were bound for library use, and did not possess the glossy 
covers that frequently advertised the expertise of that book‟s author.  
THE MEASURES: PREVALENCE AND ODDS RATIOS 
The first measure of the relationship between market dimensions and the assignment 
of particular codes is the prevalence of those codes within the each subsample. Prevalence 
can be absolute or relative. Absolute prevalence is the number of passages within a particular 
sample assigned that code. Relative prevalence is absolute prevalence divided by the number 
of passages within that subsample with at least one task code „linked‟ to that advice code. 
Using relative prevalence is important because the three subsamples contain different 
numbers of texts and there may be systematic differences in the length of the books between 
samples and the attention given to particular tasks. Relative prevalence corrects for these 
imbalances.  
While relative prevalence is descriptive and suggestive, it is impossible to assess the 
statistical significance of any observed relationships. Logistic (or logit) regression employs 
some set of variables to predict a binary outcome for a sample of cases. Using logit models, I 
can test the statistical significance of the observed relationships in the data between the 
market dimensions of fungibility and organization and whether a passage is assigned a 
particular code. The coefficients in the regression equation for „organization‟ and 
„fungibility‟ demonstrate the strength and direction of the relationship between that variable 
and the outcome of the assignment, and are used to calculate the statistical significance. 
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However, coefficients are not straightforward to interpret substantively. Coefficients are 
transformed into odds ratios by calculating e
x
 where x is the coefficient. In this case, odds 
ratios represent the proportional change in odds of a positive outcome if a case were „moved‟ 
from „0‟ to „1‟ for each variable. The assignment of task codes likely affects the odds of 
assigning each of the task codes; if the distribution of tasks differs by subsample, then task 
distribution would be a confounding variable. Logit models can include a variable for 
whether each of the task codes was assigned to each passage. 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  
PREDICTIONS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Based on preliminary coding and analysis of advice books for singular collectibles, I 
predicted the following in regards to the contents of the advice books for fungible 
collectibles: 
P1: „Advised sociability‟ codes appear more frequently in advice books for singular 
collectibles than in advice books for fungible collectibles. This should be 
especially true for the „advised sociability‟ codes linked to „evaluating.‟  
P2: Within fungible collectibles, „advised sociability‟ codes appear more frequently in 
advice books for disorganized than organized collectibles markets. 
P3: „Sociability Trap‟ codes appear more frequently in advice books for singular 
collectibles, relative to fungible collectibles. 
P4: „Anti-sociability‟ codes appear infrequently, with no clear difference between the 
two samples  
DISTRIBUTION OF TASK CODES 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of task codes by subsample and illustrates three 
primary facts about this sample. First, the distribution of tasks within guidebooks for 
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collectibles is not even. Second, the distribution of tasks differs by subsample. Third, not all 
tasks „contribute‟ equally to the population of advice codes. 
 
Guidebooks brim with advice on evaluating and, to a lesser extent, focusing, locating 
and modifying objects. Learning to recognize valuable pieces is key to the one‟s 
development as a collector. Heuristics, rules for evaluating objects, also seem well suited to 
the medium of the guidebook. They can often be easily expressed in words and are not often 
limited to particular geographic regions. Locating pieces, on the other hand, often requires 
highly particular knowledge of actual sources in an area. This sample features almost no 
advice on closing a deal once a price has been negotiated or on occupying a table or booth for 
the purposes of selling. The twelve passages coded for tableing all come from a single text on 
Singular Disorg (552 total)
Fung Disorg (373)
Fung Org (391)
Contribution (477)
0
50
100
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0
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46 45
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0
53
12
330
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11
41
2 13 4
Sample
Freq
Task
Evaluate Locate Modify
Negotiat
e
Close Focus Table
Singular Disorg (552 total) 355 64 48 16 3 79 0
Fung Disorg (373) 180 58 46 16 3 90 0
Fung Org (391) 233 46 45 25 0 53 12
Contribution (477) 330 86 11 41 2 13 4
Figure 3: Distribution of Task Codes by Subsample
Singular Disorg (552 total) Fung Disorg (373) Fung Org (391) Contribution (477)
33 
 
collecting beanie babies. This suggests that advice for these tasks is either considered by 
authors to be self-evident, too difficult to put down in words, or not important enough to 
warrant more coverage. 
The distribution of tasks appears to differ by subsample. Even though the fungible-
disorganized subsample has fewer passages overall, it clearly has a lower rate of evaluating 
codes and increased rates of focusing and locating codes. I assigned „evaluating‟ to 48.3% of 
the fungible-disorganized passages, compared to 64.3% of the singular-disorganized 
passages and 59.6% of the fungible-organized passages. I assigned „locating‟ to 15.6% of 
passages in the fungible-disorganized subsample, while only 11.6% of singular-disorganized 
and 11.8% of fungible-organized passages were coded for locating. I assigned „focusing‟ to 
24.1% of fungible-disorganized passages, compared to 14.3% of the singular-disorganized 
passages and 13.6% in the fungible-organized passages. For each of these tasks, rates are 
roughly similar between the singular-disorganized and fungible-organized subsamples, but 
different from the fungible-disorganized subsample. One exception is the task of negotiating, 
which is much more common in fungible-organized passages than both fungible-
disorganized and singular-disorganized passages. 
Finally, some tasks co-occur with advice codes at higher rates. The number of 
passages where a task code co-occurs with any advice codes is its contribution. Negotiation, 
a relatively marginal task assigned to only 57 passages, „contributes‟ 41 passages with coded 
advice. This is a more than contributions of focusing, closing, modifying and tableing 
combined. Only evaluating, locating, and negotiating contribute instances of an assigned 
advice code at a rate higher than 1/3. Because the advice codes used in this project cover both 
sociable and anti-sociable behaviors, we cannot simply conclude that the best way to locating 
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or evaluating objects, or negotiating their sale is to be sociable. However, the sociability (or 
lack thereof) of one‟s actions appears highly relevant to these tasks. 
The overlap of advised sociability codes and the various task codes provide evidence 
for the existence of the two mechanisms, sociable „acquisition‟ and „lubrication,‟ proposed to 
explain the benefits of sociability. Sociable acquisitions are necessary for tasks of focusing, 
locating, evaluating, modifying, and tableing. These tasks require skills, knowledge, contacts, 
and perspective that may be accrued through sociable interaction. About 13% of the 1,256 
passages assigned at least one of those task codes was also assigned an advised sociability 
code. Sociable lubrication is necessary for tasks of negotiation and closing. While at least one 
of these task codes were assigned to only 63 passages, 37 were assigned advised sociability 
codes. While there is clearly some evidence to support the existence of each mechanism, the 
vast differences in the attention paid to these two subsets of tasks makes it difficult to 
compare their relative importance. 
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Table 2: Absolute and Relative Prevalence of Advice Codes by Subsample 
 
Code 
A 
(0,0) 
E 
(0,0) 
R 
(0,0) 
A 
(1,0) 
E 
(1,0) 
R 
(1,0) 
A 
(1,1) 
E 
(1,1) 
R 
(1,1) 
AdvisedSoc 78 549 0.142 63 370 0.17 60 391 0.153 
Soc Trap 136 474 0.287 31 299 0.104 60 311 0.193 
Anti-Soc 45 478 0.094 8 296 0.027 29 357 0.081 
Individual Codes that Favor Fungible Collectibles (strongest to weakest effect) 
talk 4 416 0.01 7 236 0.03 3 278 0.011 
request 1 16 0.063 3 16 0.188 2 25 0.08 
barter 2 80 0.025 5 74 0.068 7 70 0.1 
ask 8 371 0.022 9 196 0.046 4 258 0.016 
survey 12 487 0.025 15 311 0.048 9 312 0.029 
see 7 355 0.02 5 180 0.028 4 233 0.017 
intro 8 64 0.125 10 58 0.172 4 46 0.087 
build 11 432 0.025 7 252 0.028 3 302 0.01 
know 13 416 0.031 8 236 0.034 10 278 0.036 
Individual Codes that Favor Singular Collectibles (strongest to weakest effect) 
handle 22 355 0.062 1 180 0.006 11 233 0.047 
club 7 463 0.015 1 281 0.004 9 321 0.028 
don’t 21 418 0.05 3 240 0.013 22 301 0.073 
reputable 22 416 0.053 5 236 0.021 7 278 0.025 
exam 122 355 0.344 29 180 0.161 48 233 0.206 
recruit 7 64 0.109 3 58 0.052 2 46 0.043 
first look 4 64 0.063 2 58 0.034 0 46 0 
honest 5 16 0.313 4 16 0.25 4 25 0.16 
Rare Advice - Absolute Prevelance for whole sample is <5 
  interest 2 474 0.004 1 299 0.003 1 311 0.003 
leverage 2 16 0.125 1 16 0.063 1 25 0.04 
friends 0 64 0 1 58 0.017 1 46 0.022 
stay cool 2 371 0.005 0 196 0 2 258 0.008 
reasonable 1 16 0.063 0 16 0 1 25 0.04 
kind 1 80 0.013 0 74 0 1 70 0.014 
get partner 1 355 0.003 0 180 0 1 245 0.004 
speedy 1 64 0.016 0 58 0 0 46 0 
cultivate 0 0 NA 0 0 NA 1 12 0.083 
refer 0 0 NA 0 0 NA 1 12 0.083 
 
note: A=absolute prevalence E=exposure R=relative prevalence 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ADVICE CODES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 shows the absolute and relative prevalence of code families and individual 
advice codes within each subsample. For example, „talk shop‟ was assigned to four passages 
in the singular-disorganized subsample (highlighted in bold). The code „talk shop‟ is only 
linked to the task codes „locating‟ and „evaluating‟. This subsample contains 416 passages 
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coded for locating or evaluating (or both). The relative prevalence of talk shop in the 
singular-disorganized subsample is about .01, or 1%. The fungible-disorganized subsample‟s 
has seven passages assigned this advice code and 236 passages coded for locating or 
evaluating, for a relative prevalence of about .03. The ratio of relative prevalence (shown in 
bold in Table 3) by fungibility is about 3:1 in favor of fungible texts.  
Table 3: Relative Prevelance Ratios 
 
  Advice R(1,0)/R(0,0) R(1,1)/R(1,0) R(1,1)/R(0,0) Family 
AdvisedSoc 1.198440748 0.901230057 1.080070824 1 
Soc Trap 0.361351564 1.860802821 0.67240401 2 
Anti-Soc 0.287087087 3.005602241 0.862869592 3 
Individual codes that Favor Fungible Collectibles (strongest to weakest effect) 
talk 3.084745763 0.363823227 1.122302158 1 
request 3 0.426666667 1.28 1 
barter 2.702702703 1.48 4 1 
ask 2.129464286 0.337639966 0.718992248 1 
survey 1.957395498 0.598076923 1.170673077 1 
see 1.408730159 0.618025751 0.870631514 1 
intro 1.379310345 0.504347826 0.695652174 1 
build 1.090909091 0.357615894 0.39012643 1 
know 1.084745763 1.061151079 1.151079137 1 
Individual codes that Favor Singular Collectibles (strongest to weakest effect) 
handle 0.089646465 8.497854077 0.761802575 2 
club 0.235383833 7.878504673 1.85447263 1 
don’t 0.248809524 5.84717608 1.454833096 3 
reputable 0.400616333 1.188489209 0.476128188 3 
exam 0.468806922 1.278673968 0.599451207 2 
recruit 0.472906404 0.84057971 0.397515528 1 
first look 0.551724138 0 0 1 
honest 0.8 0.64 0.512 1 
Rare Advice - Absolute Prevelance for whole sample is <5 
interest 0.79264214 0.961414791 0.762057878 2 
leverage 0.5 0.64 0.32 3 
friends NA 1.260869565 NA 1 
stay cool 0 NA 1.437984496 1 
reasonable 0 NA 0.64 1 
kind 0 NA 1.142857143 1 
get partner 0 NA 1.448979592 3 
speedy 0 NA 0 3 
cultivate NA NA NA 1 
refer NA NA NA 1 
 
note: R=relative prevalence (Fung score, Org Score) 
  
37 
 
These measures provide insight into underlying patterns of advice by subsample, 
which will be tested later using statistical models. First, advised sociability codes tend to 
appear more frequently in the fungible-disorganized subsample compared to singular-
disorganized and fungible-organized subsamples. The difference by fungibility, computed as 
the ratio of relative prevalence between the fungible-disorganized and singular-disorganized 
subsamples, is about 6:5. The difference by organization is similarly weak, with a ratio 
between the fungible-organized and fungible-disorganized subsamples of about 9:10. While 
these family-level relationships do not appear that strong, all non-rare advice codes that favor 
fungible texts are advised sociability codes. All but two of these codes („barter‟ and „know 
your market‟) also favor disorganized texts. This contradicts the predicted negative 
relationship between advised sociability and fungibility but supports the predicted negative 
relationship between advised sociability and organization. 
There are two non-rare codes for each of the sociability trap and anti-sociability code 
families. As families and individually, sociability trap and anti-sociability codes invert the 
general pattern of advised sociability codes. Sociability trap and anti-sociability codes favor 
singular and organized texts compared to fungible and disorganized texts, but the 
relationships with anti-sociability are stronger. The fungible-disorganized subsample 
contains only eight passages assigned at least one anti-sociability trap, compared to 45 and 
29 passages in the other subsamples. The difference by fungibility for anti-sociability is 
greater than 3:10, compared to less than 1:3 for sociability traps. The difference by 
organization for anti-sociability is greater than 3:1. These statistics support the predicted 
negative relationship between fungibility and sociability traps but contradict the predicted 
equality in anti-sociability among the three subsamples. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF ADVICE CODES: INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Table 4 shows the results from a series of logit models that use fungibility, 
organization, and the assignment of task codes to predict the outcome of a dichotomous 
variable representing whether the passage has a particular code, or at least one of a particular 
family of codes, assigned to it. Because authors can be assumed to have their own outlook 
and style, errors have been allowed to cluster by book. The three „family‟ models are 
presented first, followed by seventeen individual models. I ran no individual models for rare 
advice codes.  
  Table 4: Results from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Code Assignment 
 
Holding organization and the assignment of task codes constant, a passage from a text 
on fungible collectibles has 64% lower odds of being assigned at least one sociability trap 
code, relative to passages on singular collectibles. Because the z-value for the odds ratio is 
greater than 1.96, the difference in the odds of assigning a sociability trap code to fungible 
Table 3: Results from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Code Assignment
Code Frequency         Fungibility       Organization Links n Odds Diff LR chi2 P>chi2
Odds Ratio Z-Score Odds Ratio Z-Score (1,1)/(0,0)
Advised Sociability 201 1.161 0.59 0.808 -0.9 FLENMT 1316 0.938 0.95 0.6227
Sociability Trap 227 0.355 -2.58 1.684 1.65 FEM 1241 0.598 25.08 0.0
Anti-Sociability 82 0.28 -2.74 3.006 2.23 LENMT 1088 0.842 13.63 0.0011
Alternative Adv Soc 186 1.312 1.21 0.669 -1.88 FLENT 1316 0.878 3.18 0.2042
Advised Sociability
join a club 17 0.139 -1.86 14.531 2.88 LEM 1241 2.020 9.91 0.0071
talk shop 14 3.633 3.21 0.346 -1.74 LE 885 1.257 4.61 0.0997
ask questions 21 1.849 1.29 0.386 -1.97 LN 1136 0.714 2.72 0.256
introduce interests 22 1.396 0.51 0.487 -2.42 L 339 0.680 1.43 0.4898
survey the market 36 1.768 1.53 0.625 -1.5 FLE 1159 1.105
know your market 31 1.05 0.11 1.095 0.44 LE 1159 1.150
build relationships 21 0.714 -1.23 0.406 -1.29 LEN 1298 0.290
see collections 16 1.436 0.38 0.646 -0.48 E 939 0.928
barter 14 2.71 1.56 1.349 0.61 LN 394 3.656
recruit extra eyes 12 0.429 -1.49 0.862 -0.22 L 159 0.370
request better price 6 3.5 0.93 0.364 -1.25 N 54 1.274
first look 6 0.519 -0.72     0 if org==1 L 116
be honest 13 Not Concave N
Sociability Trap
examine closely 199 0.392 -2.03 1.346 0.74 E 1020 0.528 22.05 0.0
handle objects 34 0.09 -2.72 8.778 2.63 E 721 0.790 11.61 0.003
Anti-Sociability
don’t trust others 46 0.264 -1.89 5.752 2.39 ENM 921 1.519 11.36 0.0034
deal with reputables 34 0.343 -2.22 1.33 0.44 LE 940 0.456 6.63 0.0364
example code: logit advised fung org taskf taskl taske taskn taskc taskm taskt, cluster(book) or
note: Italics indicates significance at the .10 level; Bold indicates significance at the .05 level
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and singular passages is statistically significant at the .05 level. Object singularity predicts 
higher rates of advising sociability traps. The results for anti-sociability codes were similarly 
significant, where fungibility reduces the odds of assigning a passage an anti-sociability code 
by 72%. This confirms the patterns for sociability trap and anti-sociability codes described in 
the descriptive analysis. However, it fails to confirm the apparent positive relationship 
between fungibility and the assignment of advised sociability codes. 
Holding fungibility and the assignment of task codes constant, a passage from a text 
on an organized market has about a 201% greater chance of being assigned at least one anti-
sociability code. Because Z > 1.96, the difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
There is a similarly positive relationship between organization and the assignment of at least 
one sociability trap code. In this model, 1.96 > Z > 1.64. This means that the relationship is  
significant only at the .1 level. The observed 68% increase in the odds of a passage on an 
organized market being assigned at least one sociability trap code is more likely to be due to 
sampling error than the more robust relationship between organization and anti-sociability. 
Most of the models for individual advice codes fail to return statistically significant 
odds ratios for fungibility or organization. Only eight of the advice codes return at least one 
odds ratio that is significantly different from one at the .05 level (shown in bold). Three 
otherwise insignificant coefficients are significantly different from one at the more lenient, 
and therefore more error prone .10 level (shown in italics). 
Although the odds ratios returned by the family model for „advised sociability‟ were 
not significant, there does appear to be a general pattern of a negative relationship with 
organization and a positive relationship with fungibility. The advice code „join a club‟ clearly 
displays a different pattern; holding fungibility and the assignment of task codes constant, the 
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odds of assigning this code to passage from a text on an organized market are 1353% higher 
than the odds for a passage from a text on a disorganized market. The odds of assigning this 
code to a passage from a text on fungible collectibles are about 86% lower than a passage 
from a text on singular collectibles. However, the relationship with fungibility is only 
significant at the .10 level. 
Joining a club is only possible when clubs exist for your particular type of collectible. 
The existence of clubs is likely related to the length of time that an item has been collectible 
and how popular it is. Additionally, joining a club is a solitary act, rather than a part of an 
interaction in a market, and was almost removed from the family of advised sociability codes 
before analysis. An alternative advised sociability family was created, excluding the code 
„join a club.‟ Holding fungibility and the assignment of task codes constant, the odds of 
assigning an advised sociability code other than „join a club‟ to a passage from a text on an 
organized market are 33% lower than a passage from a text on a disorganized market. This 
effect is only significant at the .1 level. 
Three other models for individual advised sociability codes return odds ratios for 
either fungibility of organization that are significantly different from one. Holding fungibility 
and the assignment of task codes constant, the odds of assigning „introducing interests‟ to a 
passage from a text on an organized market are about 51% lower than a passage from a text 
on a disorganized market. The code „ask questions‟ shows a similar relationship; the odds of 
assigning that code to a passage from a text on an organized market are 61% lower than 
assigning the code to a passage from a text on a disorganized market. The code „talk shop‟ 
has a positive relationship with fungibility. The odds of assigning „talk shop‟ to a passage 
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from a text on fungible goods are approximately 263% higher than assigning it to a passage 
from a text on singular goods.  
Finally, logit models will omit any predictor that does not show variation in the 
outcome. The model predicting the assignment of the code „first look‟ omits organization 
because zero passages from texts on organized markets were assigned the „first look‟ code. 
While this implies a strong negative relationship between organization and the assignment of 
the „first look‟, there is no way to assess whether the relationship is statistically significant.  
Several statistically significant, and rather consistent, relationships were found among 
the four non-rare sociability trap and anti-sociability codes. Holding fungibility and the 
assignment of task codes constant, the odds of assigning the sociability trap code „handle 
objects‟ to a passage from a text on an organized market are 778% higher than assigning the 
code to a passage from a text on a disorganized market. The difference is 475% for the anti-
sociability code „don‟t trust others‟. The relationships with „examine closely‟ and „deal with 
reputables‟ appear positive but are not statistically significant. 
Holding organization and the assignment of task codes constant, the odds of assigning 
„handle objects‟ to a passage from a text on fungible collectibles are 91% lower than 
assigning the code to a passage from a text on singular collectibles. The odds of assigning 
„examine closely‟ to a passage from a text on fungible collectibles is 61% higher than a 
passage from a text on singular collectibles. The odds of assigning „deal with reputables‟ to a 
passage from a text on fungible collectibles are 66% lower than assigning the code to a 
passage from a text on singular collectibles. The odds of assigning „don‟t trust others‟ to a 
passage from a text on fungible collectibles are 74% lower than assigning the code to a 
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passage from a text on singular collectibles. However, this relationship is only significant at 
the .10 level.  
Interestingly, the two subsamples I predicted to be the most dissimilar, singular-
disorganized and fungible-organized, appear quite similar. The „Odds Diff‟ represents the 
change in the predicted odds for a hypothetical passage if it were to „move‟ from the 
singular-disorganized subsample to the fungible-organized subsample. In two models the 
odds more than double and in three the odds are more than cut in half. The rest feature more 
modest differences. For comparison, „moving‟ a passage from the singular-disorganized to 
the fungible-disorganized subsample would result in eight halvings and three doublings. 
„Moving‟ a passage from the fungible-disorganized to the fungible-organized subsample 
would result in five halvings and four doublings. This pattern is echoed in Table 2 and Figure 
3. In both, the fungible-disorganized subsample appears the most dissimilar. 
Because of the „links‟ between task and advice codes, dichotomous variables for the 
assignment of each of the task codes are included in the models. This ensures that the odds 
ratios for organization or fungibility aren‟t inflated or suppressed by differences in the 
attention paid to each task by subsample. Differences in the number of cases, or „n‟, for each 
model occur because the logit models must drop all cases with a value for a variable that 
perfectly predicts either outcome. For example, the model for „sociability traps‟ drops 
passages assigned „negotiating,‟ „closing‟ or „tableing‟ because the assignment of any of 
those task codes perfectly predicts failure in assigning a sociability trap code. The model for 
„first look‟ omits organization because organization (as opposed to disorganization) perfectly 
predicts failure in assigning „first look.‟  
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TESTING MODEL IMPROVEMENT: LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS 
In order to test if the market dimension variables, organization and fungibility, 
improve the fit of the statistical models, I ran Likelihood-Ratio (LR) tests on the four code 
family models and each individual code model with at least one statistically significant 
relationship with either fungibility or organization. The null model for the LR test uses only 
the assignment of task codes as predictors for the assignment of advice codes. LR tests 
compare the likelihood of the null model with the nested, experimental model and use a chi-
square distribution to calculate the probability that such a difference in likelihood would 
occur, assuming that the additional predictors do not improve the fit of the model. The 
degrees of freedom are equal to the number of additional predictors in the nested model; as 
the number of additional predictors increases, the difference needed for statistical 
significance increases in size. In this case, the number of additional predictors, and therefore 
the degrees of freedom, is two. 
Results from the twelve LR tests are reported in the final two columns of Table 3. 
The first column is the chi-squared statistic and the second is the probability that such a 
statistic would be found if the additional predictors did not improve model fit. A probability 
of .05 would mean that, if the additional predictors did not improve model fit, only one out of 
twenty samples of the same size would result in a chi-square statistic that large or larger. Any 
p-values less that .05 are considered statistically significant and are shown in bold.  
Essentially, the inclusion of organization and fungibility significantly improves model 
fit for those codes or code families with the strongest organization and fungibility effects. 
Models for sociability trap and anti-sociability codes, whether predicted individually or 
grouped in families, were significantly improved by the inclusion of market dimension 
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variables. Except for the code „join a club,‟ which has an unusually strong relationship with 
organization, the improvement of models for advised sociability codes is too slight to reach 
statistical significance. 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  
INTERPRETATION 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the expected and observed differences in the assignment of the 
three families of advice codes between the three subsamples. Expected differences are based 
on the four predictions presented earlier. In each case, either the singular-disorganized or the 
fungible-organized subsample is compared to the fungible-disorganized subsample. A „=‟ 
indicates an equivalence with the fungible-disorganized subsample; a „+‟ indicates increased 
and „-‟ indicates decreased odds of assigning at least one code from that family to a passage. 
The single „NA‟ indicates that no prediction was made prior to analyzing the data. 
Figure 4 : Expected and Observed Differences Between Subsamples 
 
 
The observed differences by subsample are summarized beside the expected 
differences. While some of the observed and expected differences do match, the results are 
mixed. The prediction of greater odds of assigning at least one advised sociability code in the 
singular-disorganized subsample (P1) was not confirmed. While the relationship is not 
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statistically significant, it should be noted that the direction of the effect is actually in the 
opposite direction. It does not appear, then, that markets for singular collectibles should be 
expected to be more sociable than those for fungible collectibles. 
However the prediction of lower odds of assigning at least one advised sociability 
code in the fungible-organized subsample (P2) was confirmed, at least at the .10 level. 
Market disorganization makes locating objects that one might be interested in more difficult. 
Of the nine non-rare advised sociability codes linked to the task code „locating,‟ six returned 
negative relationships with organization. The relationship is statistically significant for 
„introduce interests‟ and „talk shop.‟ Introducing your interests is a low-cost way to access 
information that others have about where to find particular kinds of objects. Such information 
is certainly more precious in disorganized markets, where the concentration of opportunities 
for purchase is more diffuse. Ten of fifty-eight „locating‟ passages in the fungible-
disorganized subsample were assigned „introducing interests,‟ while only four out of forty-
six „locating‟ passages in the fungible-organized subsample were assigned „introducing 
interests.‟ To the extent that the texts sampled represent truly expert repertoires, these results 
suggest that introducing interests, as well as other sociable behaviors, are more effective in 
disorganized markets, at least relative to one‟s other options. 
The prediction of greater odds of assigning at least one sociability trap code to 
passages in the singular-disorganized subsample (P3) is confirmed by this sample. Singular-
disorganized objects require higher levels of evaluation as value is determined by a more 
complex constellation of characteristics. For fungible collectibles, this constellation is usually 
composed primarily of condition, rarity, and popularity. For singular objects, this 
constellation also includes the materials used in, and the skillfulness of, its manufacture.  
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There is also a positive relationship between organization and the assignment of at least one 
sociability trap code, but, other things being equal, the odds of assigning a passage at least 
one sociability trap code are greatest for the singular-disorganized subsample. 
The prediction of no significant differences in the odds of assigning anti-sociability 
codes would found between any of the subsamples (P4) was disconfirmed. The odds of 
assigning at least one anti-sociability code to a passage in either the singular-disorganized 
and fungible-organized subsamples are significantly higher than the odds for passages from 
the fungible-disorganized subsample. Both non-rare anti-sociability codes are essentially 
about trust. „Don‟t trust others‟ is essentially about withholding trust from unknown persons, 
and „deal with reputables‟ is essentially about choosing to deal with known persons over 
unknown persons. 
The apparent surplus of trust in the fungible-disorganized subsample could be 
explained by the subsample‟s unique combination of the availability of information on 
current market value and a relative lack of counterfeiting. Fungibility allows for the 
publishing of price guides, and records, books and comics are almost always too expensive to 
counterfeit. Trading cards, the only likely candidate for counterfeiters within the fungible-
disorganized subsample, have a higher rate of passages being assigned anti-sociability codes 
than other collectibles in the subsample. The two short texts on trading cards contain fifty-
seven passages total, with four anti-sociability codes assigned to three different passages. Just 
over 5% of trading card passages are assigned an anti-sociability code. In contrast, the rest of 
the subsample has three hundred sixteen total passages but only five anti-sociability codes 
assigned to five different passages, for a rate of 1.6%. Simply, anti-sociability codes related 
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to mistrust are less common in texts on collectibles where market values are widely available 
and counterfeits are rare. 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This project possesses several strengths that set it apart from other qualitative 
research. First, it utilizes expert-produced material. The texts selected are written by experts 
in the field and are meant to teach novices what to expect and how to act in their respective 
markets. While in-depth interviews and participant observation may be better suited to an 
investigation of subjective experience or personal histories, the „rules and constraints‟ of 
these markets, however ambiguous, are most keenly observed by the markets‟ experts. 
Second, it combines inductive theory development with deductive theory testing. I developed 
a theory describing sociability as useful while coding material in the singular-disorganized 
subsample. I tested this theory by introducing variation in the fungibility of the objects and 
the organization of the market and constructing statistical models to calculate the differences 
in the odds of assigning codes to passages in the three subsamples. 
 This project also shares a key weakness with other qualitative studies. First, 
conclusions are based on a small number of non-random texts. Qualitative analysis 
frequently trades breadth for depth, and selecting for range should mitigate the possibility 
that year of publication or type of collectible will act as a confounding variable. One strategy 
for overcoming is to use natural language processing to code a larger body of text to decrease 
standard errors. 
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Three other possible objections concern the selection of collectibles markets as a 
case. First, collectibles markets are economically insignificant. Second, any understanding of 
face-to-face exchange in this context is quickly becoming irrelevant due to „e-commerce‟ on 
websites like eBay™. Third, it is unclear if these findings would generalize beyond markets 
where participation tends to be a leisure activity, rather than an occupation.  
The first objection is specious. „Small‟ cases can be immensely informative. While 
the value traded within collectibles markets is insignificant compared to oil or grain markets, 
collectibles markets are still competitive and require well-informed, strategic behavior. A 
study of expert accounts of how such trade ought to be pursued will provide a valuable lesson 
on the underpinnings of market culture.  
The second is simply misguided. Online sales increase costs for sellers and 
competition for buyers. It is rarely worth the time and expense of auctioning low-value goods 
online and shipping them to faraway buyers and increased exposure decreases the odds of an 
item being undervalued (and therefore a bargain). Further, verifying the authenticity and 
condition of a piece is key to determining value and is difficult to do remotely. Finally, 
internet sales are unlikely to recreate the excitement of face-to-face interaction rituals. 
Although internet auctions are a new and important aspect of the world of collecting, it seems 
unlikely that face-to-face exchange will ever be fully replaced. 
The third is admittedly a limitation of this study, but sociology is a cumulative 
discipline. Other economic sociologists have already argued that relationships are common, 
and often beneficial, within markets (Granovetter 1985; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Dore 
1983; Dyer and Singh 1983; Varman and Costa 2009). This project seeks to understand the 
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place of a related phenomenon, sociability, within collectibles markets. The extension of 
these findings to more significant and occupational markets is a challenge for future research. 
  
  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this project provide mixed support for the theoretical arguments 
presented. Relationships between the assignment of different types of codes and the 
fungibility of objects do exist. This supports the argument that economic sociologists must 
take the mediating effect of traded objects into account when describing, explaining, or 
modeling markets. However, the substantive predictions that fungibility and organization 
would be related to lower levels of sociability within collectibles markets were only partly 
correct. 
Singular objects mediate buyer-seller relationships by evoking buyer behaviors that 
allow sellers to engage the buyer in a sociable interaction. These „sociability traps‟ are more 
commonly described in the singular-disorganized subsample than the fungible-disorganized 
subsample. Handling and closely examining singular objects appear to be a more important 
part of the expert repertoire for collectors of singular than fungible objects. 
Singular objects do not appear to evoke higher levels of behaviors that overlap with 
the repertoire of a sociable actor. These „advised sociable‟ behaviors are actually less 
commonly described in the singular-disorganized than the fungible-disorganized subsample, 
although the relationship is not statistically significant. Introducing your interests and talking 
shop appear to be most important for collectors of fungible goods within disorganized 
markets. Unlike antique furniture produced by unknowable craftsmen and stamps produced 
by a faceless bureaucracy, books, records and comics (but not trading cards) offer a unique 
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opportunity to identify with the writer, musician or artist responsible. This might lead to 
greater levels of identification with other collectors and explain the elevated occurrence of 
advised sociability behaviors observed in this subsample. 
 The lack of singular-organized collectibles proved to be a greater handicap than first 
imagined. Populating this cell, if possible, would provide greater confidence in the existence 
of these relationships and would provide better estimates of the separate effects of object 
fungibility and market organization. However, I hope that this project did demonstrate the 
value of using expert-produced texts as samples of expert repertoires for particular contexts. 
While manually coding texts is time-consuming, the integration of natural language 
processing tools could automate this process and provide vast amounts of otherwise ignored 
data on different cultural repertoires. 
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